STATEMENT OF IRVIN B. NATHAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ON THE LOCAL BUDGET AUTONOMY EMERGENCY AMENDMENT ACT OF 2012

BEFORE THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ELECTIONS

JANUARY 7, 2013

Good morning, Madam Chair, Board Members, and staff. I am Irv Nathan, Attorney General for the District of Columbia. I’m joined today by my Senior Counsel Ariel Levinson-Waldman. Thank you for the opportunity to testify about the Local Budget Autonomy Emergency Act Amendment of 2012 and the D.C. Charter amendment process.

Like each of you, I am a member of the D.C. Bar and an official of the District of Columbia government. In both capacities we have taken oaths to uphold and faithfully execute the laws of the United States and the District of Columbia. In light of these oaths, I am here today to do something that is very difficult and sad, and will be urging you to do something that may be even more difficult and courageous. What I, in my capacity as an independent Attorney General and not as a spokesman for the Gray Administration, am asking you, as independent
referees of our electoral system, to do is to adhere to the D.C. Charter, passed by the Congress, signed by the President, endorsed by the citizens of the District and codified in the D.C. Code, and decline to place on a ballot for the electorate a politically popular proposed amendment to our charter, unanimously passed by the Council, signed by the Mayor, and praised by high-profile and well-meaning advocacy groups. What makes this so difficult and sad for me is that I fully support the concept of budget autonomy for the District for the revenues that we raise from our citizens. It is only just and right that we in the District be able to spend the funds we raise locally without advance permission from the Congress, which may not always have the best interests of the District in mind. That’s why I fully support the diligent efforts of Mayor Gray, Congresswoman Norton and others to convince Congress to pass legislation providing budget autonomy for our locally raised revenues. For that is the only lawful way to achieve this worthy and just goal.
Any fair reading of the Charter demonstrates the proposed amendment violates the Charter’s amendment procedures and that it would violate our governing law to place it on the election ballot. Specifically, section 303(d) of the Home Rule Act, Codified in D.C. Code section 206.03(d), states unequivocally "The [Charter] amending procedure ... may not be used to enact any law or affect any law with respect to which the Council may not enact ... under the limitations specified in §§ 1-206.01 to 1-206.03." Those sections reserve and retain for the federal government full authority over the D.C. budget and specifically provide that nothing in the Charter gives the District any right to make any change in the existing laws, regulations, procedures or practice relating to the roles of Congress, the President, the federal Office of Management and Budget, and the U.S. Comptroller General in the preparation, review, authorization and appropriation of the total budget of the District of Columbia government. Moreover, these
provisions say that the D.C. Council may not pass any law that concerns or affects the functions of the United States government, and these provisions further make clear that no expenditure by any D.C. government employee is lawful without an appropriation from Congress. The statutory provision (§ 206.03(d)) which forbids using the Charter amendment process to make any changes to the federal budget process is in the same section, indeed immediately follows the provision (§ 206.03 (c)), that empowers this Board to have a role in the Charter amending process. The prohibition is stated in clear, mandatory terms and must be followed by every entity, including most especially the Board, which is involved in the charter amendment process. As an independent agency where each of its members is chosen for “demonstrated integrity, independence, and public credibility...with knowledge [and] training... in government ethics or in elections law and procedure...” the Board has, in our judgment, a statutory obligation to make an independent examination of whether its actions would violate subsection (d).
The D.C. Court of Appeals spoke definitively on this topic more than two decades ago, when it stated: “Under the Self-Government [Home Rule] Act, Congress retains the power to appropriate all District government revenues...; the Council cannot authorize the spending of local revenues; only Congress can.” *Hessey v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics*, 601 A.2d 3 (D.C. 1991) (en banc). (emphasis added). The Court added in a footnote: “The legislative history of the Self-Government Act makes clear that the ... Act left in place the pre-existing Congressional appropriations process for the District government.” (Citations omitted.)

In my letter to you on Friday, I detailed the three separate limitations specified within D.C. Code §§ 206.01- 206.03 that would be violated by the proposed amendment and therefore barred under subsection (d) from the Charter amendment process. Any one of these three statutory limitations would, by operation of subsection (d), make it unlawful to use the Charter amendment process for the proposed
amendment and thus unlawful for the Board to place it on the ballot as part of that process. When the three are considered in their totality, the impropriety of this procedure is manifest. I’ll discuss the three limitations here briefly, and would be pleased to address any of your questions on them as well. I will then discuss in more detail what I believe the Board’s obligations are under the law, which is certainly not limited to the ministerial role of a clerk, as the D.C. Council’s submissions would suggest.

First, Code §206.02(a)(3) provides that the Council has no authority to "enact any act, or enact any act to amend or repeal any Act of Congress, which concerns the functions or property of the United States or which is not restricted in its application exclusively in or to the District." Removing the expenditure of local funds from the federal appropriations process would affect the functions of the United States by preventing Congress, with Presidential approval, from appropriating local District funds. It would also alter the functions of the federal OMB
and the U.S. Comptroller General in our budget process. It would also have an application beyond District matters by limiting the participation of the federal government in the District's budget process. In addition, changing the District's fiscal year would affect the functions of the United States and extend beyond the District's local affairs by making it difficult, if not impossible, for Congress and federal officials to review the District's finances during its regular budget cycle.

Second, the amendment would violate Code §206.03(a) because the amendment would change the long-standing roles and procedures of the stated federal entities with respect to the District's "total budget." Upon enactment, rather than being subject to the federal appropriations process, the District would establish its own budget for local funds, to be appropriated according to a different fiscal year, subject only to passive Congressional review, rather than the currently mandated active review by Congress and the President. The
amendment’s major change in the District's budget process would
directly contradict the prohibition in this section, which states:

(a) Nothing in this act [The Home Rule Act] shall be
construed as making any change in existing law, regulation,
or basic procedure relating to the respective roles of the
Congress, the President the federal Office of Management
and Budget, and the Comptroller of the United States in the
preparation, review, submission, examination, authorization
and appropriation of the total budget of the District of
Columbia government.

While ignoring the two other limitations, the D.C. Council’s submission
suggests that there are two possible readings of this provision. The first
it admits is “a bright-line prohibition of the ability of the [D.C.] Council
to affect the budget process as set forth” in the Charter. As an
alternative it posits the provision could be read simply to mean that
Congress maintains ultimate authority with respect to D.C.’s budget
and that the Council can change by Charter amendment all the parts that deal with the local part of the budget. The submission concludes that the Council prefers the second reading, without any statutory or legislative history justification. Indeed, the submission, in a part of the memo it has provided, said that Congress’s legislative intent “is not dispositive of the issue,” presumably admitting that the Council recognizes that Congressional intent favors the first interpretation. We submit there is only one fair reading of that provision, which accords with both the express language of Charter and Congressional intent: the bright-line prohibition against the Council altering the budget process as it existed when Home Rule was passed.

Third, the amendment would violate Code § 206.03(e) (a provision not discussed by the Council’s submission) because the federal law provisions incorporated by reference there prohibit government employees from obligating or expending funds in excess or in advance of an appropriation by Congress.
The proposed Charter amendment would also violate the Anti-Deficiency Act and other provisions of Title 31 of the U.S. Code, which provide for criminal and civil penalties for any government employee, including explicitly any D.C. government employee, who expends government funds without an express Congressional appropriation. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Anti-Deficiency Act would prevail and any D.C. employee who spent local funds on the basis of the proposed amendment, assuming it became operative, would be in jeopardy of federal enforcement action and job loss.

Based on these provisions of the Charter and federal law, and after an extended period of research and analysis, my office, including apolitical career lawyers who have been with the office for decades, has reluctantly concluded that each of these provisions separately, independently and collectively precludes use of the charter amendment procedures for the proposed amendment, including its
placement on a ballot for the electorate. As two prominent District lawyers, Wayne Witkowski, for over 30 years a revered member of the Corporation Counsel’s office (later the OAG), and Leonard Becker, former General Counsel to Mayor Williams and a former D.C. Bar Counsel, wrote in an op-ed piece, finding the proposed amendment unlawful, “It is no wonder that for almost four decades, the District’s elected leadership, officials and lawyers have not viewed Section 303 as a vehicle for changing the District’s budget procedures.” (I am appending a copy of the Washington Post op-ed piece to my testimony.)

In a supplemental submission over the weekend, the Council has claimed that the Board has simply ministerial duties relating to Charter amendments that the Council has proposed, that the Board has no “jurisdiction” to consider the legality of its proposed amendment, that the Board should just defer to the Council’s actions, and that the
Board’s regulations and precedent preclude its making an independent legal analysis and judgment. The Council is wrong on all counts.

The Congress chose the Board to be involved in the amendment process precisely because of its independence, neutrality and knowledge and expertise in election law and procedure. The Mayor chose, and the Council ratified, lawyers for this Board who would understand and be bound by the law and, in accordance with the statute, in the performance of their duties, “would not be subject to the direction of any nonjudicial officer of the District...” D.C. Code § 1001.06.

Hypothetically, if the Council’s views were accepted, the Board would have to put on the ballot, without any independent legal analysis, Charter amendment legislation passed by the Council no matter how plainly unlawful it was, such as: 1) abolishing the office of the Mayor (in violation of §§1-203.03 (a) and 1-204.21); or 2) precluding the U.S. Attorney from prosecuting any Council Member or Mayor for any
federal criminal offense (in violation of D.C. Code §1-206.02 (a) (8)); or
3) resegregating our public schools (in violation of the law of the land as expressed in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)). Of course, the Board would do no such thing, and in each case, it would exercise an independent legal judgment and conclude that the patently illegal measure could not be placed on the ballot, notwithstanding the Council’s (hypothetical) votes and urgings.

The controlling principle is set forth in the binding case which must govern the Board, Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In that case, the D.C. Circuit ruled en banc that the D.C. Recorder of Deeds, who generally has a ministerial role in accepting deeds for filing, may not violate with impunity governing federal law and the U.S. Constitution and thus could not lawfully record and file deeds containing racially restrictive covenants which had been declared void and unenforceable in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The D.C. 
Circuit held that even though the Recorder’s duties are ministerial, he had to make an independent legal judgment to insure that his actions were lawful under applicable law.

That is what this Board must do in this situation. It must insure that its actions in the Charter amendment process are lawful and in accordance with applicable law, including D.C. Code §1-203.03 (d). It is not a question of having “jurisdiction.” It is not a question of giving deference to the Council, which may act for political reasons not strictly in accordance with the law. It is not a question of having to have regulations to deal with the rare time that the Council may propose an amendment barred by the Charter. The Board has no regulations that speak one way or the other to the question. In any event, what controls here is the statute, which gives the Board a role in the Charter amendment process. The question is solely one of the Board making sure that its actions are lawful and not misleading the electorate that its votes will be valid and not struck down as in violation of the Charter
or other federal law. As history is our guide, this type of issue will not arise frequently and even more rarely with such clarity.

The Board’s independent legal analysis of its action is not inconsistent with its decision in *In Re School Governance Charter Amendment Act of 2000* (DCBOEE, May 11, 2000). In that case, the question was whether the Council had violated its own procedures in passing the proposed charter amendment regarding two readings of the proposed legislation in “substantially the same form.” The Board concluded it did not sit in judgment or review of the Council’s internal procedures and declined “to look behind the Council’s actions.” In this case, the Board has to decide if it can participate in the Charter amendment process by placing on the ballot a proposed amendment that is barred by the same Charter provision that gives the Board a role in the process. We are not asking the Board to “look behind the Council’s actions.” We are asking the Board to consider carefully before it takes its own action, and to be
sure that it is acting lawfully, just as the Recorder of Deeds has to do when presented with a deed that may violate federal law.

The Council’s counsel also argues that if the Board refuses to place the proposed Charter amendment on the ballot, the Board will effectively deny the District’s electorate the opportunity to let their views on this topic to be known. This, too, is wrong. The Council is fully able to pass a bill calling for a non-binding vote by the electorate in which District voters can express their views on local budget autonomy. By following the law here, the Board will prevent the voters from being misled about the likely consequence of their vote.

The Board’s independent legal analysis can and does end the necessary inquiry for the Board. However, I note that, politically unpopular as this result may seem, the Board should take some comfort, as I do, in the fact that keeping this proposed amendment off the ballot may well be in the long-term interests of the District. As you may know, before becoming the Attorney General for the District, I served from 2007 to
January 2011 as the General Counsel of the U.S. House of Representative. And many years prior to that I served as a special outside counsel for a standing committee of the U.S. Senate. This service does not color my view of the law, which is derived from the objective analysis of all of the career lawyers in my office who have examined the issue; but this service does give me some sense of how Congress views its prerogatives and powers and how it will likely react if the proposed amendment goes forward and is passed by our voters, purporting to unilaterally change Congress’s and the federal government’s role with respect to the District budget.

To put it mildly, it is not likely to be pretty. As we have seen all too vividly, Congress is already able and has been willing to intrude on the District’s affairs by enacting social policy that runs contrary to the views of the majority of District citizens regarding such issues as firearms, women’s health, and the District government’s ability to protect HIV patients. Any doubt about the likely reaction on the Hill was dispelled
by the public comments of Chairman Issa of the House Government Oversight Committee, which has jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. As quoted by Rolcall on December 7, 2012, he said, the proposed amendment “does undermine my ability to get for them [District residents] what I believe they want . . . It has been my proposal all along that nonbinding referendums, a statement of the people, a redress to their government, is positive . . . as opposed to essentially a partial secession from the union by saying, ‘We believe we have this inalienable right’ even though nowhere in the [Constitution] does this exist.” In short, he has compared the passage of this proposed amendment as a “partial secession” from the United States.

In apparent sympathy with D.C. voters, he noted “If D.C. residents are being asked to vote on a legal, constitutional question, it isn’t a fair question to place to the people.” Mr. Issa’s words may be the tip of the iceberg of problems the District would have in Congress. Congress could react not only by invalidating the amendment, but also by taking punitive measures.
Even without a punitive response, if the amendment became law, it will likely be subjected to litigation and delay in the courts, never a good thing for the budget process, which requires stability and predictability. Finally, if the amendment became law, I and every other employee of the District government would have to be concerned about our personal civil and criminal legal exposure under the federal Anti-Deficiency Act if we were to expend funds pursuant to the local budget passed by the Council but not appropriated by the Congress.

In the end, of course, these are policy decisions to be made by the Council and the Mayor. But the one question which the Board and only the Board can decide is whether it will be acting lawfully in placing this proposed amendment on the ballot and leading D.C. voters to believe that when they vote on this proposed amendment they are engaged in a matter which is properly before them. On that issue, I am urging you to make an informed independent judgment, and the analysis I have provided from our office is designed to assist you in that endeavor.
Thank you for your consideration. I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.
The Washington Post, October 26, 2012

An unlawful proposal for D.C. budget autonomy

By Wayne C. Witkowski and Leonard H. Becker, Published: October 26

The D.C. Council is moving forward with a proposal to use the referendum process to give the District autonomy over its local budget — that is, the approximately $6 billion a year that the District raises in local taxes — and thereby enable it to avoid the need to wait for congressional action as part of the often-delayed federal budget process. But this raises one big question: Can the referendum process lawfully be employed in this way to reduce the role of Congress under the Home Rule Act?

At the outset, let us state that we strongly believe that, after almost four decades of home rule, the District should be able to enact its budget for local revenue without having to get approval from Congress. Section 446 of the D.C. Charter (part of the Home Rule Act) is obsolete in this respect. Unfortunately, only an act of Congress can cure this defect.

Under the Constitution, Congress has the exclusive authority to legislate for the District. The Home Rule Act is the product of Congress’s exercise of that authority, and what Congress has given, Congress can limit or even take away. To advance the discussion on this important issue, we want to state firmly the Home Rule Act does not permit a referendum on budget autonomy. The only way the charter can be amended as proposed is through an act of Congress.

To understand why, one has to look closely at the pertinent provisions of the Home Rule Act, so bear with us as we walk through the law. Section 303 of the act specifies that it may not be used “under the limitations of sections 601, 602, and 603.” Those sections are titled “Reservation of Congressional Authority,” and Section 603(a) states: “Nothing in this Act shall be construed as making any change in existing law, regulation, or basic procedure and practice” regarding “the preparation, review, submission, examination, authorization and appropriation of the total budget of the District of Columbia government.” When the Home Rule Act was enacted, existing law, procedure and practice required the District’s total budget to be approved by Congress, and the language of the act leaves little doubt that Congress intended to prevent the District from using Section 303 to eliminate this authority — including over the portion of the D.C. budget based on local revenue.

Essentially, the District is seeking to replace affirmative congressional review of its local budget (meaning that Congress must act to pass legislation approving the budget) with passive review (meaning the local budget becomes law unless Congress takes action to disapprove it). But Congress understood
that overturning D.C. Council legislation under passive review — entailing diverting Congress from pressing national issues, expending scarce legislative time and resources to educate members about D.C. matters, winning majorities in both houses of Congress and obtaining the president’s sign-on — is a cumbersome process. Indeed, Congress has rarely overturned council legislation during the almost four decades of home rule. It is absurd to think that Congress gave the District the power to make its budget acts subject only to passive review, especially when such a change itself would be subject only to passive review.

Besides Section 603(a), Congress made its primary role in enacting the District’s budget triply sure. Section 303 also adds the limitation in Section 603(e) declaring the continued applicability to the District of the federal Anti-Deficiency Act, which requires that expenditures of the federal and the D.C. governments not exceed the amounts as appropriated by Congress. Section 303 further adds the limitation in Section 602(a)(3), which prohibits the council from amending any act of Congress, such as the Anti-Deficiency Act, that concerns the functions of the United States. It’s no wonder that for almost four decades, the District’s elected leadership, officials and lawyers have not viewed Section 303 as a vehicle for changing the District’s budget procedures.

Finally, among the legal risks of the current proposal is the prospect that the District will be sued and that the courts will rule this use of Section 303 to be unlawful. Unfortunately, if the District inflicts such an injury on itself, the cause of getting Congress to approve D.C. budget autonomy — the proper method to accomplish this — may be set back many years as members bristle at this attempt to circumvent their authority. Even if no suit is brought, D.C. government personnel who obligate and spend locally raised revenue will be in the untenable position of risking prosecution under the Anti-Deficiency Act — a strict liability statute that, under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, would preempt the proposed charter amendment.

It is simply unfair to place the District’s employees in the position of choosing possible insubordination if they refuse to obligate or spend District funds, on the one hand, and prosecution under the Anti-Deficiency Act if they obligate or spend funds, on the other.

Wayne Witkowski is a former deputy attorney general for the Legal Counsel Division in the D.C. attorney general’s office. Leonard Becker served as general counsel to Mayor Anthony A. Williams from 2003 through 2006.