

**IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION**

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Plaintiff, v. OMAR RAHMOUNI EL IDRISSE, Defendant.	Case No. 2025-CAB-2214 Judge Tanya M. Jones Bosier CLOSED CASE
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff the District of Columbia’s (“the District”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed on September 11, 2025. Defendant Omar Rahmouni El Idrissi filed an Opposition on September 22, 2025. Plaintiff filed a Reply on September 29, 2025. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motion is **GRANTED**.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The District commenced this action by filing the first Complaint on April 9, 2025 against Defendant under the Strengthening Traffic Enforcement, Education, and Responsibility Act (“the STEER Act”), D.C. Code §50-2201.04(g)(1) and the Delinquent Debt Recovery Act (“the DDRA”), D.C. Code §1-350.06(6) for “dangerous and unsafe driving offenses-totaling \$69,456 in unpaid fines, penalties, and fees owed to the District of Columbia. *See* Pl.’s Am. Compl. at 1; *see also* D.C. Code §50-2201.04(g)(1), D.C. Code §1-350.06(6). The District filed an Amended Complaint on April 29, 2025. The District filed proof of service on May 7, 2025.

In the Amended Complaint, the District alleges Defendant is in violation of the STEER Act and the DDRA “for traffic citations-many for dangerous and unsafe driving offenses-totaling

\$69,456 in unpaid fines, penalties, and fees owed to the District of Columbia.” *See* Am. Compl. at 1. The District includes the proper address for Defendant in the Amended Complaint. *See generally*, Pl.’s Am. Compl. The District further alleges Defendant has amassed two hundred and sixty-three (263) citations for traffic infractions across four different license plates from October 2015 through September 2024. *See* Compl. at 1, ¶ 1. Of Defendant’s 263 tickets, two hundred and forty-six (246) of them are for speeding; one hundred ninety-eight (198) are for driving 11-15 miles per hour over the speed limit; forty two (42) are for driving 16-20 miles per hour over the speed limit; six were for driving 20 miles per hour or more over the speed limit, which constitutes reckless driving, and one was for driving 30 miles per hour or more over the speed limit, constituting aggravated reckless driving. *See* Compl. at 1-2, ¶ 2 (citing to D.C. Code § 50-2201.04(b)(1), (c)(1)).

Defendant filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Motion to Dismiss on April 24, 2025. In it, Defendant alleged he was improperly served, that the District failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and that the Complaint filed was defamatory. *See generally*, Def. Ans. The District filed an Opposition on May 12, 2025. Defendant filed a Reply on May 19, 2025. Plaintiff subsequently filed several Amended Counterclaims and exhibits from June 16, 2025, through July 7, 2025.

On July 17, 2025, the Court denied without prejudice Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. On August 8, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Entry of Default on the Counterclaim. The District filed a Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s First and Second Amended Counterclaim and an Opposition to the Motion for Entry of Default on August 15, 2025. Defendant filed an Opposition to the District’s Motion to Dismiss on August 20, 2025. The District filed a Reply to the Opposition on August 26, 2025. Defendant filed an additional

Motion to Dismiss on September 30, 2025. On September 10, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Second Amended Counterclaim and denied Defendant's Motion for Entry of Default. *See* Ord. Sept. 10, 2025 at 8.

Plaintiff filed the pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on September 11, 2025. Defendant filed an Opposition on September 22, 2025. The District filed a Reply on September 29, 2025. In the September 29, 2025 Omnibus Order Denying Pending Motions, the Court held the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in abeyance pending Parties' attendance at an Evidentiary Hearing scheduled for December 26, 2025, at 9:30 AM. *See* Ord. Sept. 29, 2025 at 6.

Upon review of Judge Maribeth Raffinan's Order granting the District's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in similar matter against a different Defendant, the Court now reviews and rules on Plaintiff's Motion. *See District of Columbia v. Ayanna Wilson*, 2025-CAB-002036 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2025).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

a. Judgment on the Pleadings

Under Rule 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings may be granted only if, on the facts as so admitted, the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment.” *Wilson Courts Tenants Ass’n, Appellant v. 523-525 Mellon St., LLC*, 924 A.2d 289, 292 (D.C. 2007). The standard of review for motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is essentially the same as that for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). *See District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp.*, 872 A.2d 633, 639 (D.C. 2009). Thus, to survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matters, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Grimes v. District of Columbia*, 89 A.3d 107, 112 (D.C. 2014).

At a minimum, a complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a)(2).

“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see *Sundberg v. TTR Realty, LLC*, 109 A.3d 1123, 1128-29 (D.C. 2015) (“[W]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” (Citations and quotations omitted)). Thus, “[t]o satisfy Rule 8(a), plaintiffs must nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” *Tingling-Clemmons v. District of Columbia*, 133 A.3d 241, 246 (D.C. 2016) (citation and quotations omitted).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” *Carlyle Inv. Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co.*, 131 A.3d 886, 894 (D.C. 2016) (alteration in original) (citation and quotations omitted). “A complaint should not be dismissed because a court does not believe that a plaintiff will prevail on its claim; indeed, it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.” *Id.* (citation, quotations, and brackets omitted). However, legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” *Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia*, 28 A.3d 531, 544 (D.C. 2011) (quoting *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 664), so “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” *Sundberg*, 109 A.3d at 1128-29 (quoting *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678). The complaint must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Poola v. Howard Univ.*, 147 A.3d 267, 276 (D.C. 2016) (citation and quotations omitted).

a. The Strengthening Traffic Enforcement, Education, and Responsibility Amended Act (“STEER Act”)

“A person commits the offense of reckless driving if the person drives a motor vehicle on any highway in the District: (1) at a speed of 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit; or (2) in any other manner that displays a conscious disregard of the risk of causing property damage or bodily injury to any person.” *See* D.C. Code § 50-2201.04(b)(1)-(2). “A person commits the offense of aggravated reckless driving if the person drives a motor vehicle on any highway in the District: (1) at a speed of 30 miles per hour or more above the speed limit.” *See* D.C. Code § 50-2201.04(c)(1).

“The Attorney General may bring a civil cause of action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia: (A) in personam, against any driver who is suspected of violating this section; or (B) In rem, against any motor vehicle operated by a driver in a manner that violates this section.” *See* D.C. Code § 50-2201.04(g)(1). “The Attorney General shall not bring a civil cause of action as described in paragraph (1) of this subsection against any person or motor vehicle: (A) regarding a violation of this section for which the fine imposed pursuant to regulations adopted under subsection (a) of this section: (i) is being contested or appealed.” *See* D.C. Code § 50-2201.04(2)(A)(i).

b. The Delinquent Debt Recovery Act (“DDRA”)

“For the purposes of this subchapter, the term (1) ‘Central Collection Unit’ means the Central Collection Unit established within the Office of Finance and Treasury of the Office of the Chief Financial Officer to implement this subchapter. (2) ‘Delinquent Debt’ means (A) any financial obligation owed by a person to a District Agency that remains unpaid more than 90 days after it was due.” *See* D.C. Code §1-350.01(1)-(2)(A).

“Subject to subsection (b) of this section, the Central Collection Unit, in its discretion, may [...] refer a delinquent debt to the Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia for civil or administrative collection or enforcement actions.” *See* D.C. Code § 1-350.06.

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

i. Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED because Plaintiff has clearly demonstrated entitlement to judgment on the pleadings with the facts presented.

In the Motion, Plaintiff argues that “Defendant does not admit or deny any of the allegations set forth in the District’s FAC. Instead, he raises legal arguments which, aside from being waived because of Defendant El Idrissi’s failure to raise them in the statutorily provided period, fail to overcome his liability for the outstanding citation.” *See* Mot. at 8. The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s assertions and **GRANTS** the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Defendant’s primary defenses are that the District failed to meet the burden of proof required by §50-2303.06(a), which states that it “shall be on the District and no infraction shall be established except by clear and convincing evidence.” *See* Def. Am. Ans. at 2. Defendant further relies on § 50-2209.02(a) and (d), which state that “the owner or operator of a vehicle shall not be presumed liable for violations in the vehicle recorded by an automated traffic enforcement system when yielding the right of way to an emergency vehicle, when the vehicle or tags have been reported stolen prior to the citation” and that “absent an intervening criminal or fraudulent act, the owner of a vehicle issued a notice of infraction shall be liable for payment of the fine assessed for the infraction.” *See* D.C. Code § 50-2209.02(a), (d). Finally, Defendant states that D.C. Code § 50-2302.05(e) violates his Fifth Amendment “right to plead the 5th and remain silent by not contesting. The district uses responses by contesting from people who self-incriminate themselves even if they didn’t commit the infraction.” *See* Def. Am. Ans. at 4.

Defendant supports his claims with screenshots of Google AI overviews answering questions like “can technology generate false speed camera tickets.” *See* Am. Ans. at 2.

An individual who receives a Notice of Infraction for a traffic violation may answer it by: (1) paying the fine; (2) admitting the infraction with an explanation; or (3) denying the infraction. *See* D.C. Code §§ 50-2302.05(a), 2303.04(a)(1). If an individual fails to answer a Notice of Infraction within 60 calendar days, the traffic infraction will be deemed admitted, and all fines and penalties will be assessed. D.C. Code §§ 50-2302.05(e), 2303.05(d)(2). An individual may apply to vacate an admission within 60 calendar days of the deemed admission date by providing a 4 sufficient defense to the traffic violation and an excusable reason for the delay in answering the traffic violation. *See* D.C. Code §§ 50-2302.05(i)(1), 2303.05(f). After 120 days from the notice issuance, the DMV may refer debt arising from unpaid traffic infractions to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) Central Collection Unit (CCU) for collection. *See* D.C. Code § 1- 350.02(a).

Here, Plaintiff notes that, “of the 263 traffic tickets that are the subject of this litigation, Defendant El Idrissi failed to timely challenge 262 traffic citations before the DMV and was found liable for the one ticket that he did challenge. Thus, Defendant El Idrissi is liable for all 263 traffic tickets.” *See* Mot. at 5. “Basic principles of administrative exhaustion bar Defendant from now challenging the 262 tickets that he failed to challenge in agency proceedings,” and is “likewise collaterally estopped from relitigating the 262 underlying traffic tickets for which he was deemed liable because he ‘fail[ed] to contest the infraction[s], [and thereby] effectively acknowledged liability’ for such infractions.” *See* Mot. at 5 (citing *Hughes v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp. Servs.*, 498 A.2d 567, 570 (D.C. 1985); *Kovach v. District of Columbia*, 805 A.2d 957, 962 (D.C. 2002)).

In this case, the District of Columbia Department of Motor Vehicles notified Defendant “by mail of the fines and his time to resolve each of his traffic tickets [and] Defendant El Idrissi either failed to answer and was deemed liable, or answered and was found liable, for the fines and assessed penalties associated with the traffic tickets issued to his driver’s license and Virginia license plates.” *See* Mot. at 3. Furthermore, Plaintiff attaches ledgers listing each of the 263 tickets Defendant has amassed. *See generally* Compl. In his Answer and subsequent pleadings, Defendant essentially attempts to use the pending matter, which the District initiated to collect fines for infractions already adjudicated, to contest the adjudication of the infractions themselves, which is inappropriate in this jurisdiction and at this time. “Under D.C. Code § 50-2302.05(i)(3), Defendant El Idrissi would have to challenge the three ATE tickets that are less than a year old before the DMV’s Adjudication Services, not before this Court.” *See* Mot. at 7.

Defendant, in the Opposition, states that, “without the photographs and videos, or a police officer witness, the district has no case,” and that “the District’s perspective in this lawsuit is that even if you didn’t commit the infraction personally [...] if you just didn’t contest the ticket received in the mail then you are liable.” *See* Opp’n. at 1. In the Motion, Plaintiff notes that, “in each of the 263 instances, the DMV gave Defendant “at least 120 days from the date of the traffic violation to resolve each ticket. Due to Defendant El Idrissi’s failure to resolve the traffic tickets with the DMV within 120 days, the DMV referred [his] debt to the CCU.” By the time Defendant’s tickets were referred to CCU, his liability on all referred tickets had already been adjudicated; thus, Defendant’s arguments that the District has not met their “burden of proof” is incorrect. *See* Pl. Mot at 6; Def. Opp’n. at 1.

The statute is clear about what steps a party may take to defend themselves against an infraction, and the Court agrees with Plaintiff’s assertion that failure to participate in the

statutory process creates liability without imposing on constitutional rights as alleged by Defendant. As such, the Court agrees with the District's assertion that the "D.C. Code § 50-2302.05(e) violates his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent is incorrect, because the Fifth Amendment applies only to criminal proceedings." *See* Mot. at 9 (citing *DeVita v. District of Columbia*, 74 A.3d 714, 722 (D.C. 2013)).

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon review of the Motion, Opposition, and the record herein, it is therefore this 12th day of November 2025

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is **GRANTED**. It is further


ORDERED that **JUDGMENT BE ENTERED** in favor of Plaintiff the District of Columbia and against Defendant Omar Rahmouni El Idrissi for sixty-nine thousand four hundred and fifty six dollars (\$69,456). It is further

ORDERED that this Order constitutes a **FINAL JUDGMENT**. It is further

ORDERED that the Evidentiary Hearing scheduled for December 16, 2025, at 9:30 AM is **VACATED**. It is further

ORDERED that this case is **CLOSED**.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



Tanya M. Jones Bosier
Associate Judge
Superior Court of the District of Columbia

Copies e-filed and e-served via Odyssey.