SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION **Plaintiff,** **v.** **TERRELL ANTONIO JENKINS** **Defendant.**	**Case No. 2025-CAB-4004** **Judge Julie H. Becker**

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff District of Columbia's Amended Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed February 10, 2026. The motion was ripe on February 24, 2026. Defendant Terrell Antonio Jenkins has not filed an opposition. For the reasons below, the Court will grant the motion.

BACKGROUND

Beginning in September 2016 and continuing through July 2024, Mr. Jenkins received 102 traffic citations associated with six Maryland license plates and one Virginia license plate. Compl. ¶ 1. The Maryland license plates are numbered 1EV6700, T0629046, 3DT1102, 9462Z8, 1DM9438, and 932245T; and the Virginia license plate is numbered TKD7617. *Id.* ¶¶ 28, 34. Of the citations, 75 are for speeding, including eight citations for reckless driving and five citations for aggravated reckless driving. *See id.* ¶¶ 2-3. These citations entail monetary penalties totaling $33,432 in unpaid fines, penalties, and fees. *Id.* ¶ 4. In total, the amounts Mr. Jenkins owes to the District for each license plate are:

- 1EV6700: $25,740;
- TKD7617: $3,720;

- 932245T: $1,560;
- 3DT1102: $1,080;
- 9462Z8: $780;
- 1DM9438: $312; and
- T0629046: $240.

Id. ¶¶ 95-101.

On June 23, 2025, the District filed its Complaint in this matter, bringing two counts against Mr. Jenkins: Count I for Violation of the Strengthening Traffic Enforcement, Education, and Responsibility Amendment Act ("STEER Act"); and Count II for Defendant's Delinquent Debt under the Delinquent Debt Recovery Act. *Id.* ¶¶ 72-102. The District seeks the full amount of $33,432 in unpaid fines, penalties, and fees. Mr. Jenkins filed his Answer on October 17, 2025. In his Answer, Mr. Jenkins does not dispute that he owned various vehicles registered in either Maryland or Virginia. Answer at 1. However, he contests that he owes $33,432 to the District, in part because he alleges the District impounded one of his vehicles, which he believed would eliminate some of the fees owed. *Id.* at 1-2. The District filed its first Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on December 3, 2025. Following the initial scheduling conference on December 12, 2025, the District re-served the motion on Mr. Jenkins. It then filed its amended motion on February 10, 2026.

LEGAL STANDARD

As an initial matter, Mr. Jenkins has failed to file any response to the District's Amended Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Rule 12-I(e) allows the Court to treat unopposed motions as conceded. *See* D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12-I(e). For a dispositive motion, however, "[t]he general principle . . . is that [a conceded motion provision] may properly be utilized only where the movant

has established a *prima facie* entitlement to relief." *District of Columbia v. Davis*, 811 A.2d 800, 804 (D.C. 2002). This general principle "balance[s] the benefits to the administration of justice by an interpretation of Rule 12-I(e) that would allow the trial courts to grant [dispositive] motions on the sole ground that no timely opposition has been filed against the costs to litigants of foreclosure of their cause of action." *Nat'l Voter Contact, Inc. v. Versace*, 511 A.2d 393, 397 (D.C. 1986). Even if a dispositive motion is not opposed in whole or in part, the Court has a duty to consider its merits—but not with the degree of scrutiny that the Court would apply if the non-moving party had objected. *See, e.g., Murray v. District of Columbia*, 870 A.2d 25, 27 (D.C. 2005) (noting that Rule 12-I(e) permits, but does not require, the court to treat unopposed motions as conceded).

Under Rule 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings "after the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial." D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(c). If a party presents matters outside the pleadings in a Rule 12(c) motion, and the Court relies on such matters, then the Court must treat the motion as one for summary judgment. *Id.* R. 12(d).

The District has attached an affidavit to its amended motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the Court relies on that affidavit in its Order. Thus, the Court will apply the standard for ruling on a motion for summary judgment. The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *See Williams v. District of Columbia*, 902 A.2d 91, 94 (D.C. 2006). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party and must "draw reasonable inferences" in the nonmoving party's favor. *Liu v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n*, 179 A.3d 871, 876 (D.C. 2018). "A genuine issue of material fact exists if the record contains 'some significant probative

evidence . . . so that a reasonable fact-finder would return a verdict for the non-moving party.'" *Brown v. 1301 K St. Ltd P'ship*, 31 A.3d 902, 908 (D.C. 2011) (citing *1836 S St. Tenants Ass'n v. Est. of Battle*, 965 A.2d 832, 836 (D.C. 2009)).

The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact and the right to judgment as a matter of law. *Ferguson v. District of Columbia*, 629 A.2d 15, 19 (D.C. 1993). Once the movant satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence of an issue of material fact. *Id.*; *Bruno v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 973 A.2d 713, 717 (D.C. 2009). "Theoretical speculations, unsupported assumptions, and conclusory allegations do not rise to the level of a genuine issue of material fact." *Ferguson*, 629 A.2d at 19 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Instead, the non-moving party "must produce at least enough evidence to make out a prima facie case in support of his [or her] position." *Bruno*, 973 A.2d at 717 (quoting *Joeckel v. Disabled Am. Veterans*, 793 A.2d 1279, 1281-82 (D.C. 2002)).

The Court cannot "resolve issues of fact or weigh evidence at the summary judgment stage." *Barrett v. Covington & Burling, LLP*, 979 A.2d 1239, 1244 (D.C. 2009). The Court must also consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party and grant summary judgment only if no reasonable juror could find for the opposing party as a matter of law. *Biratu v. BT Vt. Ave., LLC*, 962 A.2d 261, 263 (D.C. 2008).

The Court is also mindful that Ms. Jenkins is proceeding *pro se*. While it is certainly true that *pro se* litigants "can expect no special treatment from the court," *Macleod v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr*., 736 A.2d 977, 979 (D.C. 1999), the Court of Appeals has required "trial judges to exercise special care with a *pro se* litigant in special circumstances." *Padou v. District of Columbia*, 998 A.2d 286, 292 (D.C. 2010). Nevertheless, although "a *pro se* litigant must of course be given fair and equal treatment, he cannot generally be permitted to shift the burden of litigating

his case to the courts, nor to avoid the risks of failure that attend his decision to forego expert assistance." *Dozier v. Ford Motor Co.*, 702 F.2d 1189, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

DISCUSSION

The District argues both that Mr. Jenkins is barred from challenging liability for all of the traffic citations and that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because Mr. Jenkins's total debt is supported by the pleadings. The District also included an affidavit in support of its motion. As noted above, because the Court relies on evidence external to the pleadings in granting the amended motion for judgment on the pleadings, it proceeds by addressing the District's arguments under a summary judgment standard.

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Mr. Jenkins has had a reasonable opportunity to present any pertinent material and has failed to do so. In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion for summary judgment, "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(d). The District served Mr. Jenkins with its amended motion on February 10, 2026. Mr. Jenkins did not file an opposition within the required fourteen-day response period, and he has not filed any response to date, including to the affidavit attached to the District's motion.

Under the Traffic Adjudication Act (TAA), the "notice of infraction shall be the summons and complaint," and the notice informs the recipient of how and when to answer to the infraction. D.C. Code § 50-2303.03(a)-(b). When a person receives a notice of infraction pursuant to the TAA, he has three options for how to respond: (1) admit it by paying the fine, (2) admit it with an explanation, or (3) deny that he committed an infraction. *Id.* § 50-2302.05(a)(1)-(2); *id.* § 50-2303.05(a)(1)(A)-(B). If the recipient of a notice of infraction does not respond within 60 days, then the infraction is deemed admitted and all associated penalties, fines, and fees assessed. *Id.*

§ 50-2302.05(e); *id.* § 50-2303.05(d)(2). Once a debt becomes delinquent, then the relevant District agency transfers and refers such debts to the Central Collection Unit (CCU). *Id.* § 1-350.02(a). The CCU is empowered to "prescribe, impose, and collect fees from debtors . . . associated with the collection of delinquent debt." *Id.* § 1-350.03(a). Ultimately, the District may bring a civil cause of action to recover payment of the person's outstanding fines. *Id.* § 50-2201.04(g).

The Court is satisfied that the District is entitled to judgment in the total amount of $33,432. In its Complaint, the District lists all outstanding fines and penalties associated with the 102 traffic citations issued against Mr. Jenkins. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 35, 42, 47, 52, 56, 61. The District's Department of Motor Vehicles contacted Mr. Jenkins by mail to notify him of each citation and allowed him 120 days to contest or otherwise resolve the fines and penalties. *Id.* ¶ 67. Although Mr. Jenkins disputes owing $33,432 in his Answer, Answer at 1, he did not contest any of the traffic citations within the 60-day statutory period following the dates of the notices of infraction, Am. Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 6. Nor did he file any application to vacate the deemed admissions within 60 calendar days of the date the infraction was deemed to be admitted. D.C. Code § 50-2302.05(i)(1)(A)-(B); *id.* § 50-2303.05(f)(1)-(2). As such, Mr. Jenkins's denial of liability in his Answer does not create a genuine issue of material fact that would prevent the Court from finding him liable for the underlying fines, penalties, and fees associated with the 102 traffic citations.

In addition to contesting his liability, Mr. Jenkins also contests the amount he owes. Specifically, he argues in his Answer that his impounded vehicle with the license plate 1EV6700 was worth $15,000 and should eliminate his fees. The District admits that it impounded this vehicle. Am. Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, Decl. of Antwon Temoney ¶ 3. However, the District

already sold this vehicle on September 19, 2023 for $2,100 and applied the proceeds toward towing and storage fees for the impoundment and Mr. Jenkins's unpaid traffic citations. *Id.* ¶¶ 6-7.

Accordingly, in light of the District's statutory basis for its request for $33,432, which is unopposed by Mr. Jenkins and supported by unchallenged documentary evidence in the record, the Court cannot find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the total amount Mr. Jenkins owes for unpaid traffic citations and will enter judgment for $33,432 in the District's favor and against Mr. Jenkins.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, it is this 6th day of March, 2026, hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff District of Columbia's Amended Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, is **GRANTED**. Judgement in the amount of $33,432.00 is entered in favor of the District of Columbia and against Defendant Antonio Terrell Jenkins. It is further

ORDERED that the remote initial scheduling conference on March 13, 2026 is **VACATED**. It is further

ORDERED that this case is **CLOSED**.

SO ORDERED.

Julie H. Becker
Associate Judge

Copies to:
Parties and counsel of record via Odyssey